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Discourse(s) on Europe's Foreign Policy.

Common Grounds in Hungary, Poland and Romania?

(draft version)

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Introduction

Only a few years after its founding in 1957 the European Community was already regarded as the prototypical example for integrative processes. Internationally and in the Community itself its success in integration is as well recognised as its economic capacity. Although many steps have been undertaken since 1970 to strengthen foreign policy cooperation as well, progress in this field has been far more difficult to achieve and the call for Europe to speak with a single voice in international affairs at last has been heard for years. The first notable step in this direction was taken with the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the treaty of Maastricht. Installing the High Representative for the CFSP with his staff of counsellors, currently comprising almost 50 members, and linking the WEU to the second pillar of the European Union in the Treaty of Amsterdam have been further stages on this path. Another step forward would have been renaming the High Representative the 'Union Minister for Foreign Affairs' as set out in the constitutional treaty and strongly linking the post to the European Commission as well as endowing it with the duty to represent the Union in international affairs (so far performed by the Troika). However, the negative votes by France and the Netherlands against the constitutional treaty have frozen this most recent reform task although foreign policy integration seemed to have been slowing down even before. The conflicts in the run-up to the war against Iraq with the signing of the 'letter of the Eight' and the Vilnius declaration by the majority of the East-Central and Southeastern European candidates in particular, strengthened the sceptical stances on the European project. The acknowledgement of high plausibility granted to the oversimplified and inappropriate construction, which separated the 'old' Western European countries from the 'new' Eastern ones, did not correspond to the actual dividing lines. Rather it exposed how inadequately analysed the foreign policies of the new member states and those aspiring to membership have been to date. For this reason, the foreign policies of two of the most active and already incorporated states, Hungary and Poland, as well as Romania, which is going to accede in the next round, will be closely examined in this paper. The research interest will on the one hand concentrate on those basic foreign policy directions that have been established in these countries since the system change and on the other hand it will watch their anticipated effects on foreign policy cooperation within the European Union. In this respect the paper at hand will analyse the military security concept as one exemplary line in basic foreign policy discourse. It will show how this discourse has developed since 1989 and how it has correlated with policies in the European Security- and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the framework of

CFSP. First though, attention will be drawn on those theoretical and methodological issues on which the paper rests.

Theorising European Foreign Policy

Research on European foreign policy (EFP) is faced with two difficulties. The first involves the question of its formation, i.e. its policy actors. Here, the central dividing line is the analytical focus of the study. While some authors treat the Union as *sui generis* and start their research on Union level (Whitman 1998, Stavridis 2001, Winn/Lord 2001, Ehrhart 2002, Smith 2002, Schneider 2004), others concentrate on the nation-states and try to measure the degree of influence individual countries have on shaping EFP (Hill 1996, Howorth 2000, Ehrhart 2002a, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002, Wagner 2002, Knowles/Thomson-Pottebohm 2004). Depending on the approach applied, EFP will end up with being centred around either Union- or nation-states-level. Situated between these two poles are multilevel- and governance-approaches (Filtenborg/Gänzle/Johansson 2002, Jachtenfuchs 2003, Schimmelfennig/Wagner 2004, Smith 2004c). To date, however, the latter have been applied too rarely in EFP-research. Moreover, even these approaches simply add a complexity factor between the different levels of decision-making and thus only insufficiently contribute to the balancing of the two extremes.

The second difficulty refers to the quality of EFP. Here, proponents at one end of the spectrum have a critical stand on CFSP-cooperation and assign a more declarative character to it (cf. Grieco 1995, Gordon 1997, Zielonka 1998, Hoffmann 2000). Studies of this kind conclude: "the member states clearly do not often act together (much less, effectively) on international issues" (Smith 2004a: 1). As a result of increased cooperation in recent years, especially since the summit meeting in St. Malo, proponents of this pole have, however, grown increasingly silent. Agents of the opposing standpoint view foreign policy cooperation as a process of continuous integration, put forward by institutionalisation (Garrett/Weingast 1993, Smith 2003, Smith 2004b), adaptation of norms and perceptions (Smith 2000, Tonra 2001, Øhrgaard 2004) or neo-functionalist spillover processes (Haas 1992, Haas 2001). These approaches have dominated the discussion in recent years. The split among European states following the Iraq war has, however, caused significant doubts about the plausibility of these approaches as well.

Against these difficulties, an approach for analysing EFP that on the one hand balances between nation-state and Union-level and on the other allows conceptualising the qualitatively conflicting developments following the summit of St. Malo and the Iraq war is a challenge for the research on EU's foreign policy.

The paper at hand proposes a discursive-constructivist approach, which aims at evaluating debates on the level of national political actors, first to obtain the spectrum of policy options relevant for future directions in CFSP, and secondly to shed light on their positions towards Europe's foreign policy. I will argue that this approach has the following advantages compared to others: (1) it is neutral towards the problem of focusing either on national or Union-level, (2) it offers a methodologically minimalist research design with very few theoretical axioms, and finally (3) although it shares the constructivist viewpoints with respect to the above mentioned second difficulty, it does not conceptualise EFP as continuously integrating, but views the interplay between domestic actors and national decision makers and the pressure for harmonisation as equally influential.

Language and Foreign Policy

In recent years a number of discourse-analytical studies have already appeared in political science and IR. These analyses, however, operate within an extensive range of (different) ontological and epistemological suppositions. The approach applied here is based to a large extent on the poststructuralist theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau/Mouffe 1985). With respect to foreign policy analysis two other approaches are notable. The first is the Securitization approach developed by the Copenhagen School (i.e. Ole Wæver and associates, cf. Wæver 1996, Larsen 1997) and the second the conception of discourse-analytical foreign policy analysis developed within the framework of the Pafe-project (Project on the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policies in Europe), which originated in the environment of Hanns W. Maull at Trier University (Joerißen/Stahl 2003). Beyond this, David Campbell's exploration of U.S. foreign policy (Campbell 1998) as well as Thomas Diez' analysis of the British debates on Europe, conducted within the framework of European integration studies (Diez 1999a), provide additional insights into the functioning and structure of political discourses.

The poststructuralist approach applied here builds on Wittgenstein's supposition that the meaning of words is aligned with their playful use in language games. This means, that in

order to grasp the meaning of a language sign correctly, the systemic context of its appearance, the discourse, must be scrutinized. Hence, in the process of its linguistic articulation elements without meanings are to be placed into contingently differential positions (moments) and through this process meaning is produced (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 105f). Although all arrangements of linguistic elements are contingent, over the course of time there will be certain constructions of meaning, which dominate others. This happens in so-called hegemonic articulations, by which certain moments are privileged over others under the influence of power. This way, complex networks of differential positions emerge, which are continuously rearticulated and thereby continuously modified. Thus, in contrast to structuralist approaches the theory of Laclau and Mouffe does not assume a perfect and completed structure will ever appear. Instead, structures are always in the process of redefinition and at the same time are continuously stabilised by hegemonic articulations.

Linguistic and meaning networks therefore create reality in the sense of establishing boundaries and contexts, which open and restrict option-spaces for political action. Furthermore, they even generate political action. Concerning this, Diez has referred to the performative character of speech: "Language is performative in that it does not only take note of, say, the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC). Instead, it is *through* language that this founding is performed" (Diez 1999b: 600). In this sense analysing linguistic conceptions of European foreign policy within a constructivist research design achieves concrete political relevance. A study of such a design not only analyses optional spaces of political action, but also their changes and permanent redefinitions.

Discourse-theoretical research is neutral with respect to the question of a national or a Union focus, since – in contrast to Luhmann's systems – discursive ones are to be understood as *open* systems. Despite the close connection among speakers of a common language, national borders cannot automatically be regarded as the boundaries of discourses. In particular in the case of foreign policy and to an even stronger extent of the CFSP, the facets of these discourses in a country are first developed on an executive level or in the apparatuses attached to the respective Ministries. They are in close communicative contact with the appropriate expert cultures on Union level and in these transnational contexts they develop discursive "networks that superimpose themselves on the individual states" (Burgess/Tunander 2000). In this sense integration-theoretical studies have observed consultative or cooperative reflexes (Nuttall 1992, Tonra 2001). However, since the political participants continue to act in the

respective national discourse systems as well, these expert discourses have a high probability of becoming convergent with the established discursive formations of a society. Nevertheless, in the beginning they may run contrary to some aspects of the more general discourses, since at that time they will not yet have been debated sufficiently in the national public sphere. Nonetheless since European political actors regularly have to be re-elected by their national citizenry, any possibly divergent discourses, will likely become harmonised in the course of election campaigning at the very latest. No democratically elected government will be able to act over the long term against the will of its population, without being confronted by public pressure or risking being voted out of office (Nadoll 2000: 11. Marcussen/Risse/Engelmann Martin et al. 2001: 102). The analysis of discursive systems on the political level thus reflects the level at which different worlds communicate, although it may also be assumed that the discourse characteristics on this level neither inevitably find their first nor necessarily their most pronounced expression.

Doing Research with Discourses

Discursive constructions result from complex social interactions. For this reason no mechanically applicable procedure of research such as those in quantitative analyses can be utilized to clarify these constructions. Since qualitative procedures have to be applied to reveal discursive patterns, which cannot be represented in strict positivistic terms, some researchers doing discursive analysis are tempted not to explain their methodology at all. This is often and rightly criticised by proponents of other approaches (cf. Wagner 2002: 198, fn. 139). The difficulty of discursive-analytic procedures with methodological questions is based, among other things, on the fact that they differ significantly from traditional approaches in ontological, but particularly in epistemological terms. Additionally, methodological questions are often posed in terms of positivistic epistemologies that cannot be applied to post-positivist research designs. It is for instance almost impossible to either answer the question of causal relationships between discourses and political action or to unveil *the* 'politics-relevant discourse' (Harnisch 2003: 338), because discourses represent open systems and, depending on the specific construction, *various* discourses may be politically relevant. Because of this, the current paper is less concerned with predicting actual policymaking than with disclosing those structural linkages in the EFP-discourse that mark the boundaries of what can be meaningfully articulated and therefore have potential to become implemented politically (cf. Diez 1998: 145). Beyond that, two further aspects are significant for the investigation: (1) correlations between the Hungarian, Polish and Romanian EFP-positions and their anchorage

in the respective EFP-discourse, (2) correlations between the individual national expert discourses and the individual basic national discourses. According to the theoretical assumptions underlying the project one would expect that there would exist significant convergence among the national EFP-positions resulting mainly from participation in the same expert communities. Nevertheless, it is not assumed that these positions are reasoned out in the same way. Deviations are to be expected in particular in those areas, in which distinct state-specific basic discourses have developed after system change.

The analysis of foreign policy discourses is based primarily on published texts and statements by politicians and members of the respective Ministries of the three countries during the period between 1989 and 2004. With respect to text genres the corpus includes speeches at numerous national and international institutions, essays, interviews and public statements accessible in newspapers and press releases. These are examined by qualitative content analysis. The content focus is on the discourses on foreign and security policy, oriented towards the European Union and transatlantic organisations. Not – or only partly – considered are foreign policy relations with other states, cooperation with and policies towards non-European regional organisations and discourses focusing on European neighbourhood policy. Included however are those neighbourhood relations, which seem to have constitutive effects on the general foreign policy discourse or concern such neighbours, who possess substantial relevance for the foreign and security policy of the European Union.

The analytical focus at first contains the deeply layered identity structures of foreign policy action. Identity in this context is understood as a construct of equivalences within discursive systems of differences, which is used for dissociating single systemic moments from others. By using identities, state borders, groups, and individuals are constituted and historically layered (Campbell 1998: 9f). Foreign policy analysis therefore has to deal with this establishment of linguistic differences, by which topical issues, problems and actors of the international sphere are to be defined against the background of the national[1]. Second, special attention [beyond that] is paid to the country-specific constructions of security policy issues. Security policy has to be conceptualised as an outstanding special case of foreign policy, characterised by dealing with questions of the very existence of a community. In the approach of the Copenhagen School security issues are produced by speech acts in spaces of "multiple and contested meanings" (Lipschutz 1995: 7, Wæver 1995: 55). Within these spaces there is a

[1] Unfortunately, due to space limitations this aspect cannot be considered in the current paper.

contest for hegemony and thereby for defining power in constructing security. Every policy field may attain the status of security relevance. Thierry Balzacq has pointed to the importance of national identity constructions and the inequality of access to discursive resources in constructing security issues (Balzacq 2005). Third and finally the respective EFP-discourses will be closely examined. In the accession countries this discursive strand has developed relatively late and in Romania where Union membership is still ahead, it is not very pronounced even today.

Military security aspects in national foreign policy discourse

The following section will present the national and European foreign policy discourses of the three countries with respect to military security aspects. Military power is often seen as the central category of foreign and especially security policy. Yet, constructivist research reveals that military power need not necessarily be the decisive factor in security policy (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998). Despite rather similar preconditions in Hungary, Poland and Romania after system change, military security has taken very different shapes. Here the dissimilar prior bases of the policy field in the three countries has to be considered first. In the Hungarian case opposition and dissident groups were able to assemble even during the time of the moderate regime under János Kádár and since the signing of the CSCE final act in Helsinki and particularly following the inauguration of Zbigniew Brzezinski as advisor to US president Carter. After 1989 Hungary built the new system onto this pool of persons. The two parties receiving the majority of votes in the first parliamentary elections represented the national and liberal wings of the former regime critics. The group in third place in terms of voters was a re-established pre-1948 party. This constellation has shaped foreign policy priorities in post-communist Hungary. The first government and its Prime Minister, József Antall, argued for a historic rift and the opening of a 'new chapter in our history' (Antall 1990: 158). Security in Europe would have been ensured within completely newly arranged coordinates. Military power capacities were subject to a process of de-securitization in this phase. Thus the provisional president Szűrös stated that Europe was moving towards a non-alignment, in which military means would play only a small role (Szűrös 1990: 149). Also Defence Minister Für observed that, "military aspects of security have been relegated to the background" (Dick 1994: 310). The new security problems, so the Minister of Foreign affairs Jeszenszky, are of a non-military character (Dunay 1993: 25). Accordingly Hungary strove foremost to dissolve the extant politico-military structure of the Warsaw Pact. Hungary, as the only East Central European government to do so, pleaded in June 1990 for its liquidation at a

meeting of the contracting states. In the spring of the same year liberal deputies brought a corresponding resolution into parliament. Hungary's statehood, so the argumentation, is not threatened at present and thus its security must rest on other foundations (Vásárhelyi 1990). Critical voices from the post-socialist ranks like former Foreign Minister Gyula Horn who held that a small country like Hungary needs to weigh such steps carefully (Horn 1990) did not have discursive power in this constellation. Up to the time that his party took office in Hungary the perception that even in the new era one lives in a "very complex and unfortunately unstable region in the middle of Europe" (Kovács 1995) had been generally accepted. Euroatlantic integration was seen to be serving as security against the various risks. Since Russia no longer posed a military danger to the Socialists either, Horn also argued without reservations and in strict categories for unconditional Western integration: Hungary is a sovereign state, which decides on its own whom it wants to follow. 'The Russians have no voice in this regard. That's not their concern. It's as simple as that' (Horn/Aust/Kogelfranz 1997: 113).

In Poland too a political opposition had already been constituted in communist times, though it had been forced into the underground after the imposition of a state of war in 1981. Nevertheless, oppositional groups continued to exist and developed the personnel reserve of reform-oriented actors, with whom negotiations in the Round Table talks proceeded. In the first semi-free elections they occupied all the mandates with any achievement potential. Contrary to Hungary however, Poland up until now has not succeed in establishing a consolidated party landscape. Despite the instabilities of the governing system a consensus discourse on foreign policy developed. Scarcely any controversial (discourse) lines developed and from the very beginning it produced fewer discourse exclusions than was the case in Hungary. Although Mazowiecki's Solidarność government also turned to the West, its insistence on the immediate dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was far less accentuated. In security discourse, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski articulated an 'essential dilemma' of Polish politic, originating in its geographical position between its "powerful neighbours" Germany and the Soviet Union (Skubiszewski 1991). Hence the negotiations over a departure of the Soviet army troop units stationed in Poland proceeded taking into consideration those voices, which insisted that the troops would only be removed if the 'German problem' were solved (cf. Skubiszewski 1990). For that reason the military component in Poland remained securitized. Even though there were supporters of the reducing the military aspect here too, they were made 'speechless' at the latest with the Muscovite coup in 1991. While in Hungary

it was mainly the liberal advocates from the earlier regime opposition who were the substantial carriers of the redefinition of security terms, in Poland geopolitical reasoning based on historical argumentation and the experience of new crises in Europe led liberals there towards a different interpretation: "We would prefer to live in a Europe with no arms and no alliances. But we do live in a world where military power remains the ultimate guarantor of security. We know that NATO is not a discussion club for idealists" (Geremek 1991: 19, Geremek 1997). Representatives of the post-socialist Left Alliance also followed this discourse line and argued, that because there had been some "errors of the past" (Cimoszewicz 1996) and because Poland had suffered "aggression from imperialist neighbours" (Kwaśniewski 1996) the present policy had to draw the consequences therefrom.

The starting point in Romania differed significantly from those in Hungary and Poland. During the dictatorship of Ceauşescu no organised opposition had developed, which after the bloody upheaval in December 1989, could have legitimately demanded governing authority. The reestablishment of some historical parties represented the only alternative to the old power elites. However, the extremely aged leadership of these parties were not successful in recruiting new members who would have been able to cope with today's political challenges by developing innovative solutions. State affairs thus remained in the hands of the old cadres, whose organisation won the first free elections with an overwhelming majority. In contrast to Hungary and Poland the Romanian government did not execute a clear western course by turning away from the Soviet Union. Instead, it pleaded for continued membership in the Warsaw Pact, whose security output it did not question. After the breakdown of communism, Romania was the only member of the Eastern alliance to sign a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and thereby accepted the Falin-Kvizinskij formula, which prevented a free choice of the alliance system. Consequently, in security discourse there was no construction of a military endangerment by the Soviet Union as was the case in Poland. A new security architecture, maintained Defence Minister Spiroiu, had to develop without a dominant role for military forces (Spiroiu 1991: 319). Also President Iliescu explained that military means were not promising in dealing with security problems (Iliescu 1994: 44). Only with the decay of the Soviet Union and especially the Warsaw Pact was the military potential in the region perceived as being dangerous (cf. Paşcu 1992: 276). With the decomposition of the organisation, Romania had to build up its security exclusively on the basis of its own diplomacy and armed forces (Paşcu 1992: 279), which caused an "extremely acute and pressing" security problem" (Puşcaş 1992: 29). In contrast to the Polish case, however, this

did not lead to striving for integration into western institutions as fast as possible but to an increased consideration of Russian doubts. Even if systemic opposition were eliminated, maintained Vasile Puşcaş, the military component was still present (Puşcaş 1992: 30). Foreign Minister Meleşcanu warned that if NATO did not proceed very cautiously, it could contribute to creating new tensions in an already unstable region instead of projecting stability (Meleşcanu 1993: 13). The discourse of perceived military endangerment from the Soviet successor states has declined during the years with increasing approach of Romania to western structures. Nevertheless, in the Romanian political elite, sensitivity to Russia and its military potential continues right up to today to have an ambivalent character (Roncea/Fürst 2004).

European discourse and military security

Since admission into NATO and the European Union considerations of a military endangerment of the country no longer play any role in Hungary. The actors affirm nevertheless that the Union, in view of various other security problems, has to "avail itself of the common foreign and security policy tools to ensure peace and stability of our region" (Mádl 2001). NATO and the European Union, maintains socialist party leader Kovács, have to play a complementary and supplementary role in responding to threats endangering international security (Kovács/de Hoop Scheffer 2004). After the decision to initiate strengthened cooperation in security and defence issues at Union level in 1999, the conservative government at first reacted with reserve. Prime Minister Orbán announced at that time that 'Hungary supports an independent European defence, if this does not weaken the abilities of NATO. We plead for the erecting of a European pillar in NATO' (Orbán 2000b: 8). Justifying his position Orbán emphasised that the primary aim was to acquire a security umbrella as a precondition for economic development and attracting private investments. European cooperation in security policy may therefore not weaken NATO. If in the future Europe should be capable of developing a functioning common defence policy, Hungary will be glad to participate in it (Orbán 2000a). Hungarian actors agreed that this goal should be the aim. In 2003 Prime Minister Medgyessy declared founding a 'real Europe' would be unimaginable without a common army (Medgyessy 2003). József Szájer, foreign policy expert of the current conservative opposition, wants to strengthen the European Union politically and militarily although this may be accomplished only in the long term (Szájer 2003). For this reason even after entering the Union, actors of the relevant Hungarian political parties perceive 'high politics'-issues to be the responsibility of NATO and the USA. However

this is for purely pragmatic reasons: The European Union at present does not command the necessary resources and the military security discourse in Hungary is too weak that no government in the foreseeable future would be in the position to grant additional funds for improving such capabilities.

Polish political actors support the further development of a common foreign policy in the European Union as well. Their first reactions to the initiative of increasing cooperation in security and defence issues however were even more reserved than those of the Hungarian elite. Both the socialist opposition as well as the civil government underlined the outstanding role of the North Atlantic alliance. Poland wants a 'NATO with a strong Atlantic pillar and an increasing European role', announced president Kwaśniewski (Kwaśniewski/Heller 1999). Head of government Buzek avowed Poland would 'support the idea of strengthening the European security pillar within NATO if it does not lead to competition' between the organisations (Buzek/Doerry/Krumm 2000: 131). The option of developing an independent European structure was even then impossible to articulate in the Polish discourse, if this were to have happened in agreement with NATO. Only with the surprisingly rapid development of the ESDP and Poland's confrontation with a fait accompli, did the Polish political elite speak of 'ESDP' or a 'European defence policy'. The argumentation about why an independent European policy was not desirable, reveal the central role of the military in the Polish understanding of security. On the one hand this concerns military capacities, as Danuta Hübner argued in the European convention: "Defence is not something [for which] we can rely on our gut feeling" (Hübner 2003); on the other hand it refers to the potential military endangerment to the country that Poland imagines. Wars, maintains Janusz Reiter, are a kind of natural law in East Central Europe (Reiter/Voß 2003), and former Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski,with concrete reference to Russia, adds: "a common European defence system would not be viable, since without the United States such an institution would not be capable of sovereign self-government. […] Without the United States it will not be possible to find a suitable place for Russia in Europe" (Olechowski 2001: 75). As a consequence of the military security discourse, for the Polish elite it is inconceivable to design a functional European security structure without integrating a strong and supposedly reliable external participant like the USA into this structure.

Romania's statements on the European security policy were not articulated in a pronounced and detailed manner. Differently than in Poland in particular there was little public interest in

this policy field (Calin 2002: 47). Romania too, which had not even joined NATO at this time, spoke for the influential role of the North Atlantic organisation and the USA, to which it wished to develop or maintain special relations. A "strategic partnership" with the United States was perceived as being of primary interest for Romania's foreign policy ([Ungureanu] 1999). ESDP, so EU-chief negotiator Puşcaş, would therefore depend on institutionalising relations with NATO (Puşcaş 2001: 216f). Also Foreign Minister Geoană and Defence Minister Paşcu envisioned European crisis reaction forces only within NATO structures. However these standpoints, though to some extent contrasting with those of the then EU member states, were not construed in a conflictual relationship, as was the case in Hungary and Poland. Contrary to other discussants Romanian actors largely rejected debating the long-term future prospects of the European security policy. Potential competition between ESDP and NATO could, however, develop only from this perspective. Since the elite in addition proceeded from a broad security understanding, according to which "a security and defense army is not […] exclusively shaped for war, but a vehicle of security and confidence building and preventive actions for peace and stability" (Maior/Matei 2002: 13), there remained enough space in the Romanian discourse to integrate both the European as well as the Atlantic structure without conflict. The question of building up parallel structures and the associated issue of niche capabilities for the respective European or Atlantic policies, remained unproblematic in Romania as well since in the process of modernising its own army Romania did not focus on niche capabilities. Instead, it followed a global strategy, which put the development of its own defence capacities into the foreground (Wilk 2002: 27f).

The analysis of the military security aspect in the three countries as well as the debates on ESDP shed some light on the different emphases that had developed in the security discourse after the system change. While in Hungary the military aspect disappeared in the euphoria of a new era, in the Polish debate old discourse patterns resurfaced, which construed neighbouring European countries as a source of danger. In Romania, though, a careful argumentation can be observed from the beginning. A real change in discourse here only happened in 1992 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since all countries perceive their geographic location as a crisis region, the national desire for a strong European foreign policy was congruent with the endeavour on Union level. With respect to the further development of cooperation in security policy however, it can be seen that the three national positions concurred in their critical evaluation of European security cooperation as it held the danger of potentially undermining NATO as the primary security guarantor. Nevertheless, their actual

policy on ESDP had been decidedly influenced by the desire to achieve a strong security governance in Europe. All the three countries are participating in the largest military ESDP-operation in Bosnia to date. Hungary has assigned its former 110 SFOR-soldiers to EUFOR and sent an additional 26 officers to the integrated police force in July this year. Poland has deployed about 230 soldiers in Bosnia and plans to send about the same number to a joint KFOR-battalion in 2006. Romania – although not yet an EU member – maintains a force of 110 troops in EUFOR, including a military police platoon in the integrated police unit. Increasing involvement therefore paralleled the adaptation processes in the respective discourse strands and lessened the gap between national and Union level. Hence, over the course of time national discourses approached the union discourse (and vice versa!). Above and beyond this, although the positions on ESDP corresponded in the three countries, their national *discourses* were diverging. While the paramount significance of NATO in the Hungarian discourse was justified by the absent capacities of the European Union, Polish actors argued for a security concept, which due to potential military endangerment from within Europe can only be achieved within the transatlantic alliance. Analysing the discourses on European security policy is thus to witness that on the one hand processes of integration and adaptation do indeed function over the time. On the other hand however the potential for these processes remains restricted by the limitations created by the existing national basic discourses, and – as recent developments in Poland have substantiated – by continuously rearticulating these boundaries, regressive trends may even occur.

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